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Abstract 
The central question of my thesis is how different positive emotions affect inhibition. 
Katzir, Eyal, Meiran, and Kessler (2010) addressed this question using an antisaccade task 
and found that happiness decreased inhibition compared to pride, which they attribute to the 
links between pride and long-term goals and happiness and short-term goals.  I attempted to 
generalize their results to a color-naming Stroop task and predicted that their results would 
not generalize because their study had little supporting research and their method had several 
limitations.  I tested 45 students of the Claremont Colleges and found partial support for 
Katzir et al.  Participants in the pride condition showed better inhibitory function than 
participants in the neutral condition, but I was unable to find differences in inhibitory 
function between participants in the pride and happiness or happiness and neutral conditions.  
The results suggest that pride improved inhibitory function compared to neutral emotion, but 
happiness had no effect.  I conclude that further research is needed to confirm the supposed 
distinction between pride and happiness, the strength of the links between happiness, pride, 
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Emotion and Inhibition: Pride Versus Happiness 
I am in a piano recital in a darkened auditorium and someone takes a picture.  The 
flash is bright, but I do not look up and I continue to play.  I am throwing shot put in a track 
meet and hear the gun go off for a race.  The sound is startling, but I do not turn toward it and 
I stay focused on my form.  In both of these simple situations, I use my executive system, 
particularly prepotent response inhibition, which is the ability to deliberately suppress 
dominant, automatic, or prepotent responses (Sun et al., 2009).  Inhibition, like most 
executive functions, is affected by emotion.  In a sad mood, it might be difficult for me to 
focus and successfully avoid looking at the flash of light, hold back the scream, or restrain 
myself from turning toward the tap on my shoulder.  In a happy mood, it might be just as 
difficult for me to successfully inhibit.  There are various theories and predictions as to how 
emotion affects the success of inhibition, some of which attempt to go beyond the effect of 
valence to separate the effects of different emotions of the same valence.  
Katzir, Eyal, Meiran, and Kessler (2010) examined the effects of the positive 
emotions of pride and happiness on inhibition.  They hypothesized that feelings of pride 
would increase inhibition compared to feelings of happiness because pride is linked to long-
term goals, whereas happiness is linked to short-term goals.  Katzir et al. found that 
imagining a happiness-eliciting event decreased inhibition on an antisaccade task compared 
to imagining a pride-eliciting event, as measured by the proportion of correct responses on 
the task.  Katzir et al.’s results are used to support a theory by which the effect of emotions 
on executive processes is due to the motivational role of distinct emotions.  Katzir et al.’s 
findings are interesting because the influence of emotions on executive functions is typically 
attributed to the neurophysiological consequences of emotion (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999) 
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or to emotion’s consumption of cognitive resources (Oaksford, Morris, Grainger, & 
Williams, 1996; Phillips, Bull, Adams, & Fraser, 2002).  Katzir et al.’s theory differs from 
these more accepted hypotheses because it attributes the influence of emotions on executive 
function to their direct effect on motivation.  Because Katzir et al. was a relatively recent 
study, however, there is a dearth of studies that test Katzir et al.’s hypothesis.  Furthermore, 
there are some questionable aspects of Katzir et al.’s procedure.  For my thesis, I will 
determine whether Katzir et al.’s results can be extended to another executive function task 
that taps inhibition, the Stroop task.  Here, I discuss the role of executive functions, 
specifically inhibition, the ways inhibition is studied, and the effects of emotion on executive 
functions.  I conclude this review of literature with a discussion of Katzir et al. and the study 
I conducted to determine the generalizability of Katzir et al. and investigate whether the 
distinct motivational role of different positive emotions modulates their effect on executive 
function.   
Executive Functions: Inhibition  
The purpose of executive functions is shifting mental sets, monitoring and updating 
working memory representations, and inhibition of prepotent responses (Miyake et al., 2000).  
One functional implication of executive functions is successful self-control or self-regulation 
(Katzir et al., 2010).  Self-control conflicts arise, for example, when a person faces a choice 
between a long-term goal with large, delayed benefits, and a short-term goal, with smaller, 
more immediate benefits (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Trope & Fishbach, 2000).  
Executive functions serve adherence to long-term goals by inhibiting prepotent short-term 
desires (Barkley, 2001), holding a goal and goal-related information in working memory 
EMOTION & INHIBITION  6 
(Kane et al., 2007), shielding goals from interference, and switching flexibly between goals 
(Kessler & Meiran, 2008).   
 Barkley (2001) explored the relationship between the inhibition of short-term desires 
and long-term goal attainment.  Barkley pointed out that long-term goal attainment requires 
self-regulation in order to resist the more immediate benefits of short-term goals.  Response 
inhibition is a prerequisite to self-regulation.  According to Barkley, response inhibition may 
occur at different stages of emitting a response.  First, response inhibition can be applied to 
the initial prepotent response to an event.  Second, it can apply to interruption of an ongoing 
response that is proving ineffective.  Finally, response inhibition can serve to protect the 
executive responses and the goal-directed behavior they generate from disruption by 
competing events and responses through control of attention.  
 Of principle interest here is the relationship between inhibition at the prepotent stage 
and long-term goal pursuit.  Two tasks used to study prepotent response inhibition are the 
antisaccade task and the Stroop task.  A saccade may be an automatic or directed response to 
a visual stimulus.  In antisaccade tasks, a visual onset is presented and the participant is 
required to make an eye movement away from the onset location to another target.  The 
antisaccade task was developed by Hallet (1978) to examine the mechanisms responsible for 
generating automatic and goal-directed saccades.  Katzir et al. provide one example of how 
the task has subsequently been adapted to study inhibitory control.  They presented a fixation 
point in the middle of the screen.  The visual distractor was then presented to one or the other 
side of the fixation point, followed by a target stimulus on the other side.  Then the distractor 
disappeared, and a black square masked the target after brief presentation.  The target 
stimulus was an arrow pointing up, down, left, or right.  Participants were required to 
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respond with the direction of the arrow, and in order to do so, needed to inhibit their 
prepotent response to the distractor.  Incorrect responses to the direction of the arrow 
indicated failure to inhibit the distractor. 
 Another task used to study prepotent response inhibition is the Stroop task.  The 
Stroop task is named for its inventor, John Ridley Stroop, who was concerned with 
investigating interference (1935).  In the classic Stroop task (Anderson, 2010), the participant 
is presented with color names displayed in incongruent colors of ink.  For example, the 
participant would see the word “red” in blue ink or the word “green” in red ink.  The 
participant’s task is to name the color of the ink, while ignoring the word.  The researcher 
measures how quickly and accurately the participant is able to name the ink color and 
interprets a longer delay as an indicator of interference. Stroop found that participants took 
longer to name the color of the ink when it was incongruent with the word than when the 
color of the ink was congruent with the word.  The Stroop task requires inhibitory control 
because the participant must inhibit his or her prepotent response to the base word in order to 
name the ink color. 
Emotion and Inhibition 
Inhibition is used to regulate emotion, but emotion might regulate inhibition as well.  
The exact nature of the effect of emotion is debated, however, and there are different 
hypotheses regarding the effect of happy mood on executive function tests.  Ashby et al. 
(1999) conducted a review of literature and hypothesized that positive emotion improves 
cognition.  By their theory, moderate levels of positive affect improve the executive 
functions of working memory and cognitive set selection because of the accompanying 
increase in dopamine release in the anterior cingulate cortex and prefrontal cortex – two brain 
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structures that are involved in the executive functions.  Ashby et al. based their theory on the 
fact that dopamine controls the flow of information in the frontal lobes and that dopamine 
disorders in this region cause decline in the executive functions of memory, attention, and 
problem solving.  
One source of data in support of Ashby et al.’s theory comes from patients with 
Parkinson’s disease.  When patients with Parkinson’s disease are given L-dopa, a precursor 
to dopamine that increases dopamine levels, their working memory is improved (Lange et al., 
1992).  By the same token, typical people with Parkinson’s disease who have reduced 
dopamine levels in the prefrontal cortex show memory deficits (Gotham, Brown, & Marsden, 
1988).  Ashby et al. draw the conclusion that working memory is optimized at some 
intermediate dopamine level, but is compromised at low dopamine levels.    
 Alternatively, it has been argued that positive emotion impairs performance on 
executive function tasks.  Oaksford et al. (1996) used the Tower of London task to test 
performance in a positive mood state.  The Tower of London is a classic executive function 
task that taps a wide range of executive functions, including planning, working memory, 
attention, problem solving, inhibition, mental flexibility, initiation, and monitoring of actions.  
Oaksford et al. found that induced positive mood impaired performance on the Tower of 
London task compared to neutral mood.  Oaksford et al. concluded that positive emotion 
suppresses executive function task performance by reducing the cognitive resources available 
for the task.  Oaksford et al. predicted that negative emotion would have similar effects, but 
were unable to achieve significant results for negative emotion.  Oaksford et al.’s conclusion 
regarding positive emotions is largely based on the resource allocation theory of emotion, 
which holds that emotion leads to spontaneous retrieval of emotional material and this 
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spontaneous retrieval may lead to task-irrelevant processing and subsequent depletion of 
executive resources (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1987).  
 Like Oaksford et al., Phillips et al. (2002) found that positive mood impaired 
executive task performance.  Phillips et al. used the Stroop task as their test of inhibition and 
compared four naming conditions: control, naming the color of ink in which words are 
printed; color word reading, reading aloud color words printed in different color inks; the 
classic Stroop condition, naming the color of ink in which incompatible color words are 
printed; and switching between naming color of ink and reading color words.  Participants 
were either in a neutral mood or induced into a positive mood using the mood-memory 
technique, in which they were asked to identify an occasion on which they experienced a 
high level of happiness, to think about that event, describe it to the experimenter, and to 
answer further questions about the event.  For the neutral mood condition, participants 
engaged in the same induction activities, but for a neutral event.  Participants then completed 
the Stroop task for all four naming conditions.  Phillips et al. found that being in a happy 
mood resulted in significantly slower performance on the alternating condition of the Stroop 
task and Stroop cost that approached significance in each of the other conditions.  They 
found that either positive mood impairs performance compared to neutral mood on tasks that 
require a higher executive load or that positive mood causes particular impairment on 
attentional switching because attention is more likely to be distracted by thoughts that 
maintain a positive mood.   
Emotion and Motivation 
 Katzir et al. were interested in the influence of different positive emotions on 
inhibition.  They proposed a theory by which associations between distinct positive emotions 
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and goals modulate the influence of emotional events on the executive system.  Specifically, 
they believed that happiness, because it is linked to short-term goals, decreases inhibition 
compared to pride, because it is linked to long-term goals.  Katzir et al.’s theory was based 
on evidence that imagined pride and imagined happiness influence the executive function of 
inhibition differently.  Eyal and Fishbach in an unpublished paper (2010; as cited by Katzir et 
al.) found that the emotions of pride and self-worth are implicitly associated with long-term 
goals.  In their experiment, Eyal and Fishbach compared the performance of participants 
exposed to words related to happiness or asked to write about a future event likely to evoke 
happiness and participants exposed to words related to pride or asked to write about a future 
event likely to evoke pride.  Eyal and Fishbach compared happiness and pride participants in 
their subsequent persistence on a “difficult task” (the details of which are not available) or 
their resistance to consumption of chocolate.  Eyal and Fishbach found that participants 
exposed to words related to happiness or asked to write about a future event likely to evoke 
happiness, exercised less self-control in the difficult task or chocolate consumption task than 
participants exposed to words related to pride or asked to write about a future event likely to 
evoke pride.  Eyal and Fishbach concluded that happiness is implicitly related to short-term 
goals (i.e. escaping a difficult task, giving in to the allure of chocolate), whereas pride is 
implicitly related to long-term goals (i.e. persisting on a difficult task, resisting the 
temptation of chocolate).  While Eyal and Fishbach’s results are intriguing, their study is 
difficult to evaluate because it is unpublished and Katzir et al. did not provide adequate 
details regarding the emotional manipulations and task requirements.  
 Williams and DeSteno (2008) found a similar link between pride and long-term goals.  
They found that that the emotion of pride mediates perseverance toward long-term goals 
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despite initial short-term costs.  In their study, Williams and DeSteno told participants they 
were conducting in an experiment on individual differences in cognitive abilities involving 
visual perception and mental rotation.  Participants were also told that their performance on 
the first task would be predictive of their performance on the second task.  In the first task, 
participants estimated the number of dots on a PC screen, but the task was designed so that 
participants would not be able to confidently evaluate whether their estimate was correct.  
After the task, the experimenter either gave participants acclaim or a high score in order to 
manipulate participants’ sense of pride.  It was hypothesized that participants given acclaim 
would feel greater pride compared to participants given a high score.   
 Participants in the Williams and DeSteno study then moved on to a tedious mental 
rotation task and were instructed to complete as many exercises as they wanted, to stop any 
time, and to consider that there were too many exercises to be completed in the time 
available.  Following this task, participants completed a manipulation check that confirmed 
that participants given acclaim felt more pride compared to participants given score 
information.  Williams and DeSteno found that participants who had been given pride-
inducing acclaim persisted longer in the mental rotation task than participants who had been 
given performance information.  In a second experiment, Williams and DeSteno compared 
the mental rotation task performance of participants who received acclaim with participants 
who were induced into a positive mood and found that, again, participants who received 
acclaim and subsequently felt pride persisted longer in the task.  Williams and DeSteno 
interpreted their findings to show that the emotion of pride is motivational and serves as an 
incentive to persevere in a task (i.e. a long-term goal) despite short-term costs; in this case, 
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the cost was continuing the difficult task and not enjoying the relaxation benefit of ceasing 
the task.   
One important aspect of Williams and DeSteno is unclear.  It is doubtful that 
persisting in a difficult task is actually a long-term goal.  Working on a difficult task clearly 
takes longer and requires more effort than ceasing a difficult task, but persisting on a task for 
several minutes does not fit our usual conception of long-term goals.   
Katzir et al. on Emotion and Inhibition 
  Katzir et al. predicted that pride and happiness would influence executive functions 
based on the hypothesized links between pride and long-term goals and between happiness 
and short-term goals.  They predicted that imagining a future event of happiness would 
decrease inhibitory control compared to imagining a future event of pride because imagined 
happiness would prime short-term goals and imagined pride would prime long-term goals.  
These predictions hinge on two hypotheses: first, on the hypothesis that pride and long-term 
goals are implicitly linked and that happiness and short-term goals are implicitly linked (Eyal 
& Fishbach, 2010; as cited by Katzir et al.); and second, on the hypothesis that executive 
functions serve adherence to long-term goals by inhibiting prepotent short-term desires 
(Barkley, 2001).  If long-term goals are primed, inhibitory mechanisms are presumably 
activated.  If long-term goals are not primed, or if short-term goals are primed, then 
inhibitory mechanisms will not be activated and inhibitory control will suffer.   
 Two potentially problematic issues are not clearly addressed by Katzir et al. First, 
they did not explicitly define long- and short-term goals.  Based on their experimental design 
explained below, they implicitly define short-term goals as those that offer immediate 
gratification and long-term goals as those that offer delayed gratification.  The definition of 
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long- and short-term goals cannot be taken for granted because in different contexts, these 
terms can carry different meanings.  For example, in our commonplace conception of goals, 
long-term goals refer to what may be attained in the distant future, whereas short-term goals 
refer to what may be attained in the near future.  Katzir et al., however, seem to be using a 
definition of long- and short-term goals based on the proximity of gratification to the action 
taken.  
Second, Katzir et al. did not acknowledge that both long-term and short-term goals 
are vulnerable to interference and may require inhibition.  If you are playing in a piano 
recital, for example, and your short-term goal is to finish your piece correctly, then you must 
inhibit a respond to someone taking a picture with flash in order to achieve your goal.  This is 
problematic for Katzir et al. because it seems to narrow their definition of short-term goals to 
what may be attained in the near future without inhibition.  This definition excludes willful 
actions toward short-term goals, which is not the definition I believe Katzir et al. intended.  It 
is perhaps more accurate to characterize their conception of short-term goals as what may be 
attained in the near future with less inhibition over time than long-term goals.  
 In order to test their prediction that happiness would decrease inhibition compared to 
pride, Katzir et al. used an antisaccade task as a measure of inhibition.  In Experiment 1, 
there were three participant conditions.  In the first condition, participants were asked to 
write about a future experience they expected to evoke feelings of happiness and fun.  In the 
second condition, they were asked to write about a future experience they expected to evoke 
feelings of pride and self-worth.  In the third condition, participants were asked to imagine an 
emotionally neutral event.  In order to strengthen the imagined emotion, participants were 
exposed to pictures of individuals expressing the corresponding emotions.  All participants 
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then completed the antisaccade task.  In order “to increase [the] inhibitory challenge” (p. 
1315), Katzir et al. used all male participants and used pictures of female models in bathing 
suits as the distractor that participants needed to make a saccade away from.  Katzir et al. 
predicted that participants who imagined a happiness-eliciting event would perform less well 
on the antisaccade task compared to participants who imagined a pride-eliciting event 
because imagining happiness primes short-term goals, whereas pride primes long-term goals.  
The dependent measure was the proportion of correct responses (correct identification of the 
direction of the target arrow) on the antisaccade task.   
 Consistent with their hypothesis, Katzir et al. found a smaller proportion of correct 
responses in the imagined-happiness condition than in both the imagined-pride condition and 
the neutral condition.  Katzir et al. also found, however, that there was no difference in the 
proportion of correct responses in the imagined-pride and control conditions, which was 
contrary to their hypothesis that the consideration of pride-eliciting events would increase 
inhibition compared to the neutral condition.  Katzir et al. realized a limitation: the use of 
models in bathing suits as a distractor might have led participants in the imagined-happiness 
condition to gaze longer at those happiness-eliciting pictures, resulting in poorer 
performance.   
 In order to rule out the possibility that imagined happiness increased the tendency to 
gaze longer at pictures related to happiness rather than decreasing the inhibition of any 
distractors, Katzir et al. conducted Experiment 2 in which they used distractor pictures 
related to happiness as well as related to pride.  In this study, half of the participants were in 
the happy mood condition and performed the antisaccade task with happiness pictures – the 
models in bathing suits – while the other half performed were in the pride mood condition 
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and performed the task with pride pictures – images of national pride and achievement 
symbols such as images of the Israeli flag, medals, and graduation symbols.  If the 
participants in the imagined-happiness condition were gazing at happiness pictures longer 
because of their relationship to the imagined emotion, then pride participants would gaze at 
pride pictures longer and the effect observed in Experiment 1 would disappear.  Katzir et al. 
predicted, however, that imagining happiness would decrease inhibition regardless of 
distractor content.  In other words, they did not expect the effect reported in Experiment 1 to 
interact with the distractor condition.  Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, except 
that there was no neutral control condition in Experiment 2.   
 Katzir et al. replicated the results of Experiment 1 with the proportion of correct 
responses smaller in the imagined-happiness condition than in the imagined-pride condition.  
They found that the effect of imagined emotion on inhibition was independent of distractor 
content, ruling out the explanation that imagined happiness increased tendency to gaze at 
"pleasurable” pictures rather than impairing inhibition (p.1318).   
 Katzir et al. attributed their results to the possibility that some imagined emotions 
influence inhibition while others do not.  They also propose the possibility that in the 
academic setting in which the study was conducted, pride and long-term goals are 
continuously activated, making the neutral condition in fact more similar to the imagined-
pride condition.  Katzir et al. ultimately concluded that imagining events that elicit positive 
emotions differentially affect inhibition, a mechanism enabling self-regulation.  They 
believed that because pride is linked to long-term goals and happiness is linked to short-term 
goals, imagining future events likely to elicit those emotions either increases or decreases 
inhibition respectively.  
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 Katzir et al.’s theory that distinct emotions affect executive function differently due to 
their motivational role requires more supporting evidence.  Besides limited supporting 
research, Katzir et al. had several limitations in their study.  First, they used all male 
participants and images of female models as their distractors in order to increase the 
inhibitory challenge.  Images of female models may be distracting to males in particular 
because they are sexually arousing, not simply because they are related to happiness.  This 
would be problematic because participants in Experiment 2 were divided such that the 
participants in the happiness condition saw only images of female models in bathing suits 
and people in the pride condition saw only symbols of pride, so it is possible that participants 
in the happiness condition did not perform as well because the stimuli was sexually arousing. 
Second, Katzir et al. had a neutral emotion condition, but did not have a condition with 
neutral distractor content.  Without a neutral distractor condition, it is be impossible to 
measure a baseline level of inhibition.  A baseline is important because it would show how 
distracting images are in general for people in different emotional conditions.  Finally, Katzir 
et al. only used one type of inhibition task.  To ensure the validity of their results, it is 
important for their findings to generalize to another task.    
 For my thesis, I tested whether Katzir et al.’s findings generalized to the Stroop task, 
another executive function task that taps prepotent response inhibition.  I used the classic 
color-naming Stroop task.  Before participants completed the Stroop task, I induced them 
into imagined-happiness, imagined-pride, or neutral emotion conditions using the same 
method as Katzir et al. This method consisted of instructing participants to imagine a 
happiness-eliciting, pride-eliciting, or neutral event and exposing participants to images of 
people displaying the corresponding emotions.  The dependent measure was reaction time to 
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indicate the color of the words.  Longer reaction time presumably indicated that participants 
had difficulty inhibiting the base word to indicate its color.   
If Katzir et al.’s theory was correct, I expected to see longer reaction times for 
participants in the imagined-happiness condition.  Because Katzir et al. has limited support 
and several limitations that might have exaggerated their results, I predicted that their 
findings would not generalize to another task.  I believed that I would find the general effect 
that positive mood impairs inhibition, resulting in longer reaction times for both imagined-
happiness and imagined-pride compared to controls, but without significant difference 
between reaction times for imagined-happiness and imagined-pride.  I based this prediction 
on Phillips et al.’s finding that positive mood impaired inhibition on various Stroop task 
conditions and their suggestion that positive mood interferes with attention.  
Method 
Participants  
 Participants were a convenience sample of 45 students of the Claremont Colleges (24 
women, 21 men) who volunteered to take part in a study about emotion and inhibition.  The 
participants were randomly assigned to happiness, pride, or neutral emotion conditions. Each 
emotion condition was comprised of 15 participants. 
Materials 
 The images used in the emotional manipulation were of men and women who 
appeared happy, proud, and neutral taken from Tracy, Robins, & Schriber (2009) and were 
the same images used in Katzir et al.  The Stroop task was adapted from Stroop (1935) and 
programmed using SuperLab. The base-words were “red,” “blue,” “green,” and “yellow” and 
were presented in red, blue, green, or yellow font.  A congruent trial consisted of a base-word 
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presented in a font color that matched the word. For example, the word “red” presented in red 
font.  An incongruent trial consisted of a base-word presented in a font color that did not 
match the word.  For example, “red” presented in blue font.  There were 96 trials: 4 
presentations of 12 types of incongruent trials and 12 presentations of 4 types of congruent 
trials. Words were programmed in 48-point font and each word was followed by a 500 
millisecond inter-stimulus interval (ISI).  Participants indicated the color of the font using a 
keyboard. 
Procedure 
The procedure was adapted from Katzir et al. and the independent variable was 
emotional condition.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: pride, 
happiness, or neutral. The first part of the experiment was an emotional manipulation.  
Participants were instructed to describe an event that would make them feel pride and self-
worth (pride condition) or happiness and joy if it happened in the near future (happiness 
condition), or how their room would look in the near future (control condition).  Participants 
were then exposed to four pictures of individuals (two male and two female) with proud, 
happy, or neutral expressions corresponding to the participant’s emotion condition, presented 
from the waist up (Tracy, Robins, & Schriber, 2009).  In order to mask the intent of the 
image presentation, participants were asked to rate each picture on brightness and sharpness 
(7-point scale: -3 = not sharp/not bright, 3 = sharp/bright).   
After the emotion induction, participants completed the Stroop task to measure 
inhibition success.  Participants in all conditions were instructed to press a specific keyboard 
key, as quickly as possible, corresponding to the ink color of the presented base-word and 
response time (RT) was recorded.  Upon completion of the task, participants were debriefed 
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as to the purpose of the experiment.  RTs below 200 milliseconds and above 2000 
milliseconds as well as erroneous responses were excluded from data analysis.  The 
dependent measure was percent increase in RT between the congruent and incongruent trails 
which I represented as the Stroop interference score for each participant; Stroop interference 
= mean RT incongruent – mean RT congruent)/mean RT congruent in percent.  
Results 
 A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of emotional condition on 
Stroop interference after pride, happiness, or neutral emotion manipulations.  There was a 
marginally significant effect of emotional condition on Stroop interference for the three 
conditions [F(2, 42) = 2.98, p = 0.06].  Post hoc LSD comparisons indicated a significant 
difference between the pride condition (M = 6.58%, SD = 6.50%) and the neutral condition 
(M = 13.17%, SD = 9.09%).  There was no significant difference between the pride condition 
and the happiness condition (M = 9.76%, SD = 6.29%).  Neither was there a significant 
difference between the happiness and neutral conditions.   
Discussion 
 This experiment was designed to determine whether Katzir et al.’s finding that 
happiness decreased inhibition compared to pride or neutral emotion could be replicated in 
another prepotent response inhibition task, the Stroop task.  My first prediction was that 
Katzir et al.’s findings would not generalize to another task because Katzir et al. had several 
limitations and potentially exaggerated results.  My second prediction was that I would find a 
general effect that positive mood impairs inhibition compared to neutral mood based on 
evidence that positive mood interferes with attention (Phillips et al., 2002).  Contrary to my 
predictions, I found that participants in the pride condition had a significantly smaller 
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average Stroop interference scores compared to participants in the neutral condition.  I 
interpret this difference to indicate increased inhibitory function for people experiencing 
pride.  I did not find significant differences in Stroop interference between the pride and 
happiness conditions or happiness and neutral conditions.  I interpret this result to show that 
people experiencing happiness or neutral emotion had comparable levels of inhibitory 
function.  Both the significant and insignificant results failed to support my hypotheses that 
Katzir et al.’s results would not generalize and that positive mood would impair inhibition 
compared to neutral mood.  
 Although my prediction that Katzir et al.’s findings would fail to generalize was 
incorrect, my results only partially support Katzir et al.’s theory.  Katzir et al.’s primary 
significant result was that participants in the happiness condition showed decreased 
inhibitory functioning compared to participants in both the pride and neutral conditions as 
measured by proportion of correct responses on an antisaccade task.  My results, on the other 
hand, showed that participants in the pride condition had increased inhibitory function 
compared to the neutral condition, but not compared to the happiness condition.  While my 
results do not match the pattern of Katzir et al.’s results, they do support the aspect of Katzir 
et al.’s theory that holds that pride increases inhibitory function.  My results, however, do not 
support the aspect of Katzir et al.’s theory that holds that happiness decreases inhibition 
compared to pride.  
 The first possible explanation for my mixed results is that the emotional manipulation 
for pride may have been stronger than the emotional manipulation for happiness.  During the 
emotional manipulation, participants in the pride condition were asked to describe an event 
that would make them feel pride and self-worth if it happened in the near future.  Many 
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participants wrote about graduation or securing jobs and internships.  Participants in the 
happiness condition were asked to describe an event that would make them feel happiness 
and joy if it happened in the near future.  Many participants in this condition wrote about 
seeing pets or visiting family.  It is possible that the events described in the pride condition 
evoke a stronger emotion than the events described in the happiness condition because they 
are more consequential and affect the rest of a person’s life.  Interestingly, participants in 
both the pride and happiness conditions wrote about receiving good grades.  This crossover 
points to the possibility that the emotions felt in the pride and happiness conditions are 
related.  If participants in the happiness condition felt an emotion that is closer to pride than 
to happiness, then there would likely be no significant difference in participants’ inhibitory 
functioning between pride and happiness, as the results indicated.  
 Happiness and pride are two positive emotions that are difficult to tease apart.  One 
way of drawing a more distinct line between the two would be to prompt participants with 
the sort of events the experimenter considers “happy” and events the experimenter considers 
“proud.”  For example, the prompt for happiness might suggest events such as having a piece 
of candy or watching a favorite television show, while the prompt for pride might suggest 
events such as graduation or earning a good grade.  This strategy seems likely to elicit more 
distinct responses for happiness and pride, but another possibility is that my results show that 
the natural distinction between happiness and pride is too blurred for people to be able to 
consider the emotions independently.  If this is the case, then the emotions of happiness and 
pride do not constitute truly independent variables and the entire premise of Katzir et al.’s 
theory – the distinction between happiness and pride – is challenged.      
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 The second possible explanation for my results and inability to fully confirm or 
contradict Katzir et al.’s theory is that the methodological differences between my 
experiment and Katzir et al.’s experiment may have been too great.  Katzir et al. used an 
antisaccade task, but I used a Stroop task with the goal of determining whether their results 
would generalize to a different inhibition task.  Both the antisaccade task and the Stroop task 
test prepotent response inhibition, but prepotent response inhibition may be multifaceted.  It 
is possible that the antisaccade task taps a different aspect of inhibition than the Stroop task 
in which case, results from the antisaccade task would not be expected to generalize to the 
Stroop task at all.   
A more likely methodological explanation for the differences in my and Katzir et al.’s 
results is that Katzir et al.’s limitations created the circumstances necessary to see their 
results.  One of Katzir et al.’s limitations included the confounding of sexual arousal and 
happiness by the use of female models in bathing suits as distractors for participants who 
were all male.  The sexual component of Katzir et al.’s study may have created a type of 
distraction much different than the type of distraction created by an incongruent color/word 
stimulus in the Stroop task.  In Katzir et al.’s first experiment, they only used pictures of 
female models in bathing suits for their distractor images and in their second experiment they 
used these “happy” images for participants in the happiness condition and used proud 
images, such as national and graduation symbols for participants in the pride condition and 
found no difference related to the content of the distractor images.  The sexual nature of the 
distractors for the happiness condition might have been necessary to achieve their results.  A 
second limitation of Katzir et al. is that they did not use any neutral distractor content to find 
a baseline level of distraction in their task.  Because Katzir et al. did not find differences due 
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to distractor content, I supposed that distractor content should be irrelevant and used only 
neutral stimuli in my experiment.  It is possible that inhibition of emotionally salient material 
is different than inhibition of neutral material.  Emotional stimuli capture more attention than 
neutral stimuli, so it is possible that if I had used words related to pride and happiness rather 
than neutral words, I might have achieved more dramatic results or results more similar to 
Katzir et al.  
Emotional distractor stimuli might have been just the right choice in Katzir et al. 
because long-term and short-term goals have an emotional component and in pursuit of these 
goals, emotional distractors would be the most relevant and salient.  For example, the goal 
might be graduating or the goal might be having a piece of cake. Both goals are emotional in 
their own ways and would require the pursuer to inhibit appealing distractions with 
emotional implications, such as hanging out with friends or stopping to stare at a bikini-clad 
girl on the lawn.  In pursuit of the original goals, neutral distractors would likely be less 
salient and easier to inhibit.  For Katzir et al., this would mean that participants primed for 
short-term or long-term goals with happy or proud implications would be more distracted by 
interesting, competing emotional stimuli than by neutral, basically irrelevant stimuli.   
In future research, I would use the same method, but I would use happiness, pride, 
and neutral words in case the use of emotional stimuli accounts for the differences between 
my results and Katzir et al.’s results.  Another possibility would be to use the same 
antisaccade task as Katzir et al., but use neutral stimuli.  This method would eliminate the 
possible confounding of sexual arousal and happiness found in Katzir et al. and would be 
sure to tap the same inhibitory mechanism as Katzir et al. if it is the case that antisaccade 
tasks require a different inhibitory mechanism than Stroop tasks.  Future research on positive 
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emotion and inhibition should seek to determine whether Katzir et al. are working with a 
significant distinction between happiness and pride, whether there are reliable connections 
between happiness and short-term goals and pride and long-term goals, and whether the 
effect of different positive emotions may be generalized.  Further evidence is needed in 
support of the motivational power of positive emotion and its effect on inhibition.  
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